EDITORIAL by unknown
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Published monthly during the Academic Year by the Yale Law Journal Co. Inc.,
Edited by Students and members of the raculty of tho Yale Law SchooL
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $459 A YEAR SINGL= COPIES, C9 CENTS












ALFRED M. BINGHAm LEE M. G AI
ROBERT BOASBERG RUTH A.
R03ERT Al. BoZE=IAN GARRETT S.
OSCAR S. CoX BERNARD C.
JuLus G. DAY, JR. ELLIOTT R.
GEORGE H. DESSION HERBERT B.
ALFRE L. FERGUSON I. OSCAR I
WLLiAm C. FITrs MIER D. D































The JouRu'L consistently aims to print matter which prczents a vicw of merit
on a subject deserving attention. Beyond this no collective responlbillty is a,-umcd
for matter signed or unsigned.
CONTRIBUTORS OF LEADING ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUI,
CAssIus J. KEYSER is Adrain Professor of Mathematics, Columbia Univer-
sity. He is the author of MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY.
CHARLEs E. CLARK is Professor of Law, Yale University.
CHARLES U. SAA NOW is a student at the Yale Law School and an editor
of the Yale Law Journal.
STAN=Y MORmSON is Associate Professor of Law, Stanford University.
RECOVERY OF TREBLE DAMAGES UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
The problem of determining under what circumstances to
award threefold damages under section 7 of the Sherman Anti-
Trust ActI has again been raised ,in the case of Bel!t,'d Oil
126 STAT. 209 (1890). The Clayton Act re-enacted section 7 of the
Sherman Act to cover such further minor amendments as had becn made
to the substantive provisions of the Sherman Act. See section 4, 33 STAT.
731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1926): "Any person who shall be injured
[503]
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Terminal Corporation v. Mexican Petroleum Corporation.2 The
allegations of the complaint were as follows: the defendants,
a corporation and its officers, connected with the Doheny in-
terests, attempted to secure exclusive control of the New Eng-
land sales market in oil. The plaintiff Ballard Oil Burning
Equipment Company was at that time competing with the
Fess Company in selling equipment and the necessary fuel
oil therefor. The defendants organized the Petroleum Heat &
Power Company to take over the Fess interests, and refused
to sell oil to any but this creation of their own. The Ballard
Equipment Company then formed the other plaintiff, the
Terminal Company, as a subsidiary to buy oil. To this end,
the Terminal Company entered into a fifteen year contract with
the New England Refining Company, the only other wholesaler
competing with the defendants. The defendants then secured
directoral control of the Refining Company which promptly broke
its contract with the plaintiffs. As a result the plaintiffs were
unable to procure oil for sale, and they claimed that their
business was destroyed. The allegations of these facts, charging
conspiracy and combination to monopolize the business in re-
straint of interstate commerce, were held on demurrer to state
good causes of action under section 7.3
The Sherman Act has been much criticized as not fulfilling
its purpose,4 even as amended by the Clayton Act.2  It would
seem that it was intended to check just such combinations as
here presented in the allegations. But as the fastening of
responsibility on a monopoly in restraint of trade has always
been, both at common law and under the statutes, a difficult
undertaking, it appears proper at this time to review the deci-
sions under section 7 of the Act, with a view to determining
some of the grounds of recovery. Before doing so, two assump-
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
trust laws may sue therefor in any district court . . .without respect to
the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attornoy's
fee." For a comprehensive annotation on the section see 15 1. S. C. A.
§ 15 (1927).
228 F. (2d) 91 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928), rev'g 22 F. (2d) 434 (D. Mass.
1927).and 22 F. (2d) 437 (D. Mass. 1927).
S The district court sustained the demurrers on the ground that there
was no combination or conspiracy shown in selling one's product exclu-
sively to one dealer, relying on Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 218
Fed. 447 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914). See infra note 25.
ASee especially Probst, The Failure of the Anti-Trust Law (1926) 75
U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 122; see also Raymond, The Federal Anti-Trust Aot
(1910). 23 HAav. L. REV. 353, summarizing the achievements of the Act
and suggesting improvements.
5 See Levy, The Clayton Law, an Imperfect Supplement to the Sherman
Law (1916) 3 VA. L. REv. 411.
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tions must be made clear. The private right of action is pro-
vided as a supplement to the governmental enforcement of the
Act.6 It was intended rather to protect the "competitive system"
than an injured individual." Secondly, there can be no very
clear distinction between a contract or combination in restraint
of trade and a monopoly, although sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act apparently establish them as distinct offenses.0
The tendency, as exemplified in the instant case," to allow a
complaint to state in one count violations of both sections as
ground for an action in tort would seem to support this view. 0
No attempt will be made to distinguish these offenses.
It has recently been held that the damages are penal, and so will
not survive against executors. Haskell v. Perkins, 28 F. (2d) 222 (D.
N. J. 1928). But see Sampliner v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 Fed.
277, 278 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
7The title of the Act is: "An act to protect trade and commerce against
unlawful restraints and monopolies." And see Penn. Sugar Refining
Co. v. Am. Sugar Refining Co., 166 Fed. 254, 256 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903):
"An agreement or combination for the elimination of competition from
an economic viewpoint may not operate in restraint of trade. It may
actually develop and increase trade. Such an agreement, however, from
a legal viewpoint is necessarily in restraint of trade. The law regardG
competition as the life of trade, and so that which restricts competition
restrains trade."
9 See 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2 (1926). It seems clear
that the Act is directed against the evils of monopoly, as opposed to free
competition, whether or not the monopoly affects interstate or foreign
commerce. But under the Constitution Congress could not "assert the
power to deal with monopoly directly as such." United States v. Knight,
156 U. S. 1, 16, 15 Sup. Ct. 249, 255 (1895).
9 See the statement in the instant ease, supra note 2, at 99, that,
"The gist of the action is a conspiracy or combination to create an undue
restraint of trade and a monopoly as its result. Surely an undue reztraint
of trade might well create a monopoly and that this is alleged does
not make the declarations duplicitous." Cf. Ware-Kramer Tobacco Co.
v. Am. Tobacco Co., 178 Fed. 117, 125 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1910): "The
evil at which this statute is aimed is of national importance and the
remedies provided should not be restricted by technical and narrow
rules of pleading."
1 At first it was thought that section 1 itself expressed two cause3
of action, a contract on the one hand, and a combination or c)npiracy
on the other, and a declaration under section 7 was held duplicitous when
it included both in one count. Rice v. Standard Oil Co., 14 Fed. 4G4
(C. C. D. N. J. 1905). This rule was practically abandoned when a
declaration, alleging both contracts and combinations as well as a con-
spiracy to monopolize, was held good. Buckeye Powder Co. v. 3. 1.
DuPont de Nemours Powder Co., 196 Fed. 514 (D. N. J. 1912). And in
Cilley v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 202 Fed. 598 (D. Mass. 1913), it
was held that a declaration was not duplicitous which alleged both a
combination in restraint of trade and a monopoly, as they were part
of a single scheme.
3 See, however, THORNTON, A TREATISE ON TuIr SIIERAlN A;TI-TrusT
ACT (1913) § 123; Monarch Tobacco Works v. Am. Tobacco Co., 165
Fed. 774, 776 (C. C. W. D. Ky. 1908).
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The majority of the actions for triple damages have been
brought against manufacturers. Only in one of the first cases
has the defense that a manufacturer is not engaged in inter-
state commerce12 been successfully raised,13 even where the
combination did not extend beyond the state,14 or where there
were no interstate dealings between the parties to the action.'5
The plaintiffs in such actions are as likely to be injured dealers 21,
or consumers 17 as competing manufacturers; 11 for in most of
the cases of combinations of manufacturers, the manufacturers
have been actively selling their own product and attempting to
monopolize marketing as well as production. Among other types
of combinations held responsible are combinations of dealers
even where only within one city, 9 and combinations to monop-
olize shipping 20 or carriage.21 A telephone monopoly has been
sued, but the decision hinged on the right of shareholders to
bring action for injuries to their company.2" Labor organiza-
tions may be held responsible, but actions for threefold damages
are few, probably because better results from the injured
employer's point of view can be reached by injunction.2" It
12 As made in United States v. Knight, supra note 8.
13 Dueber Watch Case Co. v. Howard Watch Co., 66 Fed. 637 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1895). This was the first case disposed of under section 7.
4 Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, 24 Sup. Ct. 307 (1904);
Gibbs v. McNeeley, 118 Fed. 120 (C. C. A. 9th, 1902); Ellis v. Inman
Poulsen Co., 131 Fed. 182 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904); of. Pae. States Paper
Trade Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm., 4 F. (2d) 457 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
155Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 27
Sup. Ct. 65 (1906) (city forced to pay high prices by combination); Ellis
v. Inman Poulsen Co., supra note 14.
16 Montague & Co. v. Lowry, supra note 14.
17 Ellis v. Inman Poulsen Co., supra note 14.
28.Penn. Sugar Refining Co. v. Am. Sugar Refining Co., supra note 7.
19 Hale v. O'Connor Coal & Supply Co., 181 Fed. 267 (C. C. D. Conn.
1908); Hale v. Hatch & North Coal Co., 204 Fed. 433 (C. C. A. 2d,
1913); see infTa note 40; cf. Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111
Fed. 96 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901), where recovery against a combination of
dealers apparently would have been given if plaintiff'& damages had not
been wholly speculative.
2o Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66, 37 Sup. Ct. 353 (1917).
2" Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 183 Fed. 548 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910).
This decision apparently overruled an earlier case to the effect that the
damage arising through unfai'r rates was a matter for the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Am. Union Coal Co. v. Penn. R. R., 159 Fed.
278 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1908); of. Keogh v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., infra
note 55.
22Ames v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 Fed. 820 (C. C. D. Mass. 1909); of.
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 Fed. 704 (C. C. A. 3d, 1910), on the
question of a shareholder's right to sue; see Note, L. R. A. 1917E 1000.
23 The two famous cases of suits against labor organizations or their
members are Loewe v. Lawlor, and Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mline
Workers. The first case, commonly known as the Danbury Hatters Case,
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thus appears that almost any kind of combination or monopoly
may be within the scope of section 7.2' "Anti-Trust" is some-
what of a misnomer.
The particular schemes or forms under which a combination
or monopoly may be carried out can hardly be classified. They
may be simple contracts between two competitors establishing
prices, or complex series of holding companies, subsidiaries,
affiliations, and agreements, under the control of a number of
individuals approaching an actual monopoly, such as seems to
be presented in the instant case. Some of these forms of
organization will be discussed below. The only form of com-
bination which has been consistently held immune is that between
first appears in the reports in 1904, 130 Fed. 03.3 (C. C. D. Conn.).
There are eight reported decisions, one in memorandum, and the case
was finally disposed of with a judgment for the plaintiffs against certain
property-holding members of the hatters' union, on its third appcarance
in the Supreme Court, in 1915, thirteen years after the occurrence of the
acts complained of. 235 U. S. 522, 35 Sup. Ct. 170 (1915). The Coronado
Coal Case was similar. There are five reported decisions covering the ycars
1916 to 1925. The final decision, instead of holding members of the union
responsible for acts of the union in which they took no part, held the
local union (but not the national union) for the acts of its members.
268 U. S. 295, 45 Sup. Ct. 551 (1925). The only other reported case
of a labor organization being sued under section 7 of the Sherman Act
hinged on the proper service of process. Christian v. International A'n
of Machinists, 7 F. (2d) 481 (E. D. Ky. 1925). For a criticism of the
theory of responsibility of a labor organization see Megaarden, The Danburyj
Hatters Case (1915) 49 AM. L. Ruv. 417. See also Comment (1922) 32
YAIx L. J. 59.
24 Other combinations that have been held responsible are: a moving
picture film agency: Binderup v. Pathe, 263 U. S. 291, 44 Sup. Ct. 96
(1923); a bill poster association: Ramsay Co. - .Asociated Bill Postero,
260 U. S. 501, 43 Sup. Ct. 167 (1923); a combination of booksellers:
Mines v. Scribner, 147 Fed. 927 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1906). Circulation
of newspapers may be interstate commerce, so conceivably a combination
of newspaper publishers would be responsible. See Konech- v. Jewish
Press, 288 Fed. 179, 181 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923). In Noyes v. Parzonz,
245 Fed. 689 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917), a combination of banls appeared
to be within the scope of the Act, but was not held responsible, as the
plaintiff showed no injury. Here as always the court must decide whether
there is a restraint of interstate commerce. See i-2fra note 51. The
following combinations were held not to come within the Act, as not
affecting interstate coramerce: a baseball league: Nat. League v. Fed.
Baseball Club, 259 U. S. 200, 42 Sup. Ct. 465 (1922); sce (1921) 19
lisca. L. REv. 867; a publisher of advertising: Blumenstock Bros. Ad-
vertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U. S. 430, 40 Sup. Ct.
385 (1920); an association of citizens conducting a prosecution to test
the validity of a town ordinance: Citizens Wholesale Supply Co. v. Snyder,
201 Fed. 907 (C. C. A. 3d, 1913). A vaudeville circuit appears now
not to come within the law, though it may transfer actors and their
paraphernalia from state to state. Hart v. Keith Vaudeville, 12 F. (2d)
341 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926). Contra: Marienelli v. United Booking Offices,
227 Fed. 165 (S. D. N. Y. 1914) ; see infra notes 38 and 51.
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a manufacturer and a dealer, by which the latter is created
exclusive sales agent for the manufacturer.25  One case seems
to hold the same for an exclusive buying agency.0 The theory
of thepe cases is that interstate commerce is not intentionally
or directly- restricted thereby. But the combinations are in
effect "vertical" trusts, not "horizontal," and as such they do




The character of acts done seems to be more important in
determining responsibility than the type or form of combination.
Price-fixing seems to be per se iniquitous under the Act.28 This
may result from an agreement entered into by both manufac-
turers and dealers, 21 or by manufacturers alone,30 or by dealers.51
25 Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 227 U. S. 8, 33 Sup. Ct.
202 (1913) (contract creating exclusive sales agency not actionable com-
bination); Locker v. Am. Tobacco Co., supra note 3 (jobber cannot re-
cover where manufacturer sells exclusively to one jobber); Baran v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 256 Fed. 571 (S. D. N. Y. 1919). But
when maintenance of control of sales is attempted through other means
than an exclusive agency, or when there is a combination of manufac-
turers instead of a single one, Immunity will not be granted. See infra
notes 34 and 37.26 Arkansas Brokerage Co. v. Dunn & Powell, 173 Fed. 899 (C. C. A.
8th, 1909) (mercantile jobbers in city organize brokerage firm to buy
from within and without state). Though it seems reasonable to hold
a buying agency legal on the same ground as a selling agency, this case
seems to be out of line in view of the combination involved. See supra
note 25.
27 Cf. in this connection Alex. Milburn Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 15 F. (2d) 678 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926) (unity of control held not
violative of Sherman Act, where there was no competition between products
of companies controlled).
28 Cf. United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct,
377 (1927), where even a showing that the prices were reasonable as
fixed by the combination, did not prevent a conviction.
29 Montague & Co. v. Lowry, supra note 14 (combination of dealers
within state with certain national manufacturers, determining local prices
for member dealers, responsible to dealer discriminated against as to whole-
sale price); Ellis v. Inman Poulsen Co., supra note 14 (combination of
dealers and manufacturers of lumber within city maintained high prices
and refused to sell to consumers who bought elsewhere); Wheeler-Stenzel
Co. v. Nat. Window Glass Jobbers Ass'n, 152 Fed. 864 (C. C. A. 3d,
1907) (corporate combination of 75 per cent of all jobbers and whole-
sale dealers in glass, fixing prices of sales to retailers, and contracting
with chief manufacturer for favored price, held responsible to competitor
unable to procure stock).
30 U. S. Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 163 Fed. 701 (C. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1908); Weisert Bros. Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 163 Fed.
712 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1908) (combination to cut out price competition
and limit production by manufacturers of licorice paste held responsible
to consumer forced to pay high price). Contra: Dueber Watch Case
Co. v. Howard Watch Co., supra note 13 (no interstate commerce involved).
' Cf. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, supra note 24 (combina-
COMMENTS
The maintenance of non-competitive shipping rates by a com-
bination of steamship lines is similarly actionable- 2 But price-
fixing carried out by one manufacturer through an exclusive
sales agency, is not unlawful, for, as suggested, it is not a
horizontal monopoly. 3 And, apparently on the same ground,
where a manufacturer refuses to sell outright or only at an
increased price to retailers who cut prices below that fixed for
resale, the retailer cannot recover without more.34
Another form of activity held a violation of the Sherman
Act is the securing control of a competing corporation and
removing it from competition-5 Recovery may be had, however,
only if the party plaintiff is the party injured.-" Controlling
tion of billposters, fixing prices, dealing exclusively with certain solicitors
of advertising, and attempting national monopoly, held responsible to
injured solicitors).
3 2 Thomsen v. Cayser, sup;a. note 20 (maritime shipper not allowed
rebate when dealing with lines outside combination can recover against
combination).
33 Baran v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., s.pra note 25.
34Ibid.; Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. 454 (C. C. A.
8th, 1903); Frey & Son v. Cudahy Pacldng Co., 25G U. S. 203, 41 Sup.
Ct. 451 (1921); Welch Grape Juice Co. v. Frey & Son, 2G1 Fed. GS
(C. C. A. 4th, 1919); Brown, The Right to Ref zwe to Sell (1916) 25
YALE L. J. 194; Dunn, Resale Price AMaiztzane (1923) 32 YLE L. 3.
676; Note (1919) 19 CoL. L. RE.. 149. But of. Eastman Kodak Co. v.
So. Photo Mat'ls Co., 273 U. S. 359, 47 Sup. Ct. 400 (1927), where a
horizontal monopoly was much more clear and recovery was granted.
The situation is also obviously different when prices are dictated by a
combination instead of by a single manufacturer. See Jayne v. Loder,
149 Fed. 21, 27 (C. C. A. 3d, 1906). In certain cases recovery has been
granted against single manufacturers, but there were apparently more
undesirable practices involved. Mines v. Scribner, infra note 303; Victor
Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny; Straus v. Victor Talldng Machine Co.,
both infra note 37.
-3 Penn. Sugar Refining Co. v. Am. Sugar Refining Co., supra note 7
(corporation can recover when defendants gain share-control and -top
business); cf. Strout v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 202 Fed. C02 (D.
Mass. 1913), where a company of which plaintiff was trustee voted under
defendants' control to cease doing business: the declaration was held suf-
ficient but judgment was later for the defendants due to the running of
the statute of limitations. 208 Fed. 046 (D. Mass. 191,3). Where control
was secured through unauthorized acts of the officers of the company
whose receivers are suing, recovery has been denied. Tilden v. Quaher
Oats Co., 1 F. (2d) 160 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924). Similarly where all the
shareholders agreed to the acquisition of control by the defendant. Blue-
fields S. S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 3d, 1917). Cf. in
this connection Western Wooden-Ware Ass'n v. Starkey, S4 Mich. 70, 47 N.
W. 604 (1890), where the purchase of a competing business in order to close
it up was held void at common law as in restraint of trade.
6 Recovery has been denied to a shareholder in a company Which Was
removed from competition by the defendant's securing control of it.
Ames v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 22.
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the market by means of patent "license agreements" may be
similarly actionable.3 7 Boycotting and blacklisting generally
entail responsibility,38 though probably more as actionable torts
in combinations otherwise considered violative of the Act, than
as themselves evidence of its violation." Apparently a court
will readily find a violation of the Sherman Act where a com-
bination has been using such unfair trade practices as espionage,
instigation of employment difficulties, intimidation of customers
or dealers, and the like,40 though "clean hands" seem to be
an essential in the person seeking relief.0
In summarizing the restraints or combinations that may be
held actionable, parties plaintiff may be put in two categories.
The first comprises injured competitors of a monopolistic defend-
ant; they can usually recover whether they are removed from
business by internal-2 or external violence,43 or whether their
business is merely restricted by limitations on their buying
or selling market through contracts "4 or other means. 5 The
37Victor Talking Machine Co., v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 810 (C. C. A. 3d,
1921); Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 297 Fed. 791 (C. C. A.
2d, 1924).; Cilley v. United Shoe Machinery Co., supra note 9. For a
discussion of the basis of this rule, see Comment (1928) 38 YALE L. I.
246; Note (1924) 37 HARV. L. REv. 1142.39 Montague & Co. v. Lowry, supra note 14; Binderup v. Pathe, supra
note 24; Mines v. Scribner, supra note 24 (publishers responsible to
blacklisted price-cutters) ; Marienelli v. United Booking Offices, supra note
24 (vaudeville performers' agency, blacklisted for not dealing exclusively
with defendant combination of theatre owners and booking offices, can
recover for inability to secure engagements due to threat by combination
to blacklist theatres).
39 But in the Danbury Hatters Case, supra note 23, where the damage
arose through a secondary boycott on the plaintiffs' hats, the boycott
itself seemed to be the restraint of trade which made the combination
illegal.
40 Peoples Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 170 Fed. 396 (C. C. A.
5th, 1909); Ware-Kramer Tobacco Co., v. Am. Tobacco Co., 180 Fed. 160
(C. C. E. D. N. C. 1910); Am. Steel Co. v. Am. Steel & Wire Co., 244
Fed. 300 (D. Mass. 1916). In Hale v. O'Connor Coal & Supply Co.,
and Hale v. Hatch & North Coal Co., both supra note 19, the transactions
were almost wholly intra-state, but the methods of the alleged combina-
tion in secret blacklisting and slandering apparently led the court to
hold declarations good on demurrer.
1Recovery was denied in Buckeye Powder Co. v. E. L Du Pont do
Nemours Powder Co., 248 U. S. 55, 39 Sup. Ct. 38 (1918), apparently
because the plaintiff, claiming '$4,000,000 damages for unfair competitive
practices, seemed to have been formed as a competitor of the defendant
only to extort a high selling-out price.
42 See supra note 35.
43 For example, unfair trade practices. See supra notes 38 and 40.
4"Cilley v. United Shoe Machinery Co., supra note 10; Wheeler-Stenzel
Co. v. National Window Glass Jobbers Ass'n, supra note 29; Hood Rubber
Co. v. U. S. Rubber Co., 229 Fed. 583 (D. Mass. 1916) (manufacturers
of shoes controlling supply of lasts through contracts, responsible to com-
petitor, but makers of lasts not responsible).
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second category comprises injured dealers or customers, that
is, those not in competition with the defendant. They may
recover, if they are directly injured, as by an increase in price
on the defendant's product,- 'i or if, as is more frequent, their
markets are limited by restraints on the competitors of the
defendantY But a mere refusal by a defendant to trade with
dealers or customers until some conditions are complied with
is not actionable 4 3 unless the defendant is a combination other-
wise unlawful, or the condition imposed is that the plaintiff
shall not deal with the competitors of the defendant9 Under
this classification the labor cases are seen to be anomolous,
and must be put in a third category, unless it be admitted,
contrary to the declaration of the Clayton Act,-" that an employer
injured by a labor organization is a customer whose labor
market is restricted by a monopoly of labor.
For recovery under section 7 of the Sherman Act, the first
requisite is that the defendant's business must affect interstate
commerce.51 This is not necessary as regards the plaintiff.-"
-1 Montague & Co. v. Lowry, supra note 29; Ware-Kramer Tobacco Co.
v. Am. Tobacco Co., supra note 40.
- Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Co. v. Atlanta, supra note 15; O'Hal-
loran v. Am. Sea Green Slate Co., 207 Fed. 1S7 (N. D. N. Y. 1913), 7cv'd
on ground of failure to show damage, 229 Fed. 77 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915).
47 Gibbs v. McNeeley, supra, note 14; Jayne v. Loder, supra note 34;
Mines v. Scribner; Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, both mpra note
24.
4S See supra notes 33 and 34.
49 See supra note 47. This seems to be specifically prohibited by section
3 of the Clayton Act. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 14 (1926); cf.
Binderup v. Pathe, supra note 24.
= "Labor is not a commodity." 38 ST.AT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §
17 (1926).
55 This requirement of course is also common to the criminal and equit-
able actions under the Sherman Act. For combinations that have not
been held responsible under section 7, as not engaged in interstate com-
merce, see svpra note 24. Also cf. Corey v. Boston Ice Co., 207 Fed.
465 (D. Mass. 191.3) (vendors of ice, cut and brought into state by them,
are not engaged in interstate commerce; but no damage to plaintiff in
fact shown). Where a combination deals with amusement enterprises the
restraint of commerce is generally incidental if prezent at all. See Note
(1924) 72 U. op PA. L. REv. 293.
z' Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Co. v. Atlanta, supra note 15; ce
United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 Fed. 574,
577 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916). But see Bishop v. Am. Preservers Co., 51 Fed.
272, 274 (C. C. N. D. fI1. 1S92), where in the earliest reported case on
the subject, the fact that plaintiff was not engaged in interstate com-
merce seemed of some force in denying relief.
53Konecky v. Jewish Press, supra note 24 (boycotting and personal
persecution no ground for recovery where no attempt to monopolize inter-
state commerce); see Jack v. Armour & Co., 291 Fed. 741, 745 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1923).
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Moreover, as the right of action depends on acts "forbidden in
the anti-trust laws," the plaintiff's injury must arise from some
specific activity of the defendant in restraint of or in monopoly
of interstate commerce, 3 though such restraint may be quite
foreign to the purposes of the combination. 4  And similarly,
if the injury is not the result of an illegal act, the defendant
can escape responsilqility though he has in fact otherwise violated
the statute.5 But it is clear that if the injury is the result
of a general scheme that is unlawful, as in the instant case,
the fact that the individual acts of the defendant may have been
within the law is no defense.
5 0
It is often held, as in the instant case, that the restraint
of trade to be actionable must flow as the necessary and direct
result of the defendant's conduct," but as is frequent when a
court professes to deal with causes and results, the result is
likely to be called indirect if the court on other grounds has
decided not to hold the defendant.8  It is also sometimes said
5 The tenuous distinction on which responsibility is based is brought
out in the labor cases, as well under section 7. as in equity. See Note
(1924) 28 A. L. R. 1015. In the Coronado Coal case the defendants
were the local and national unions, manifestly organized to monopolize
labor. But recovery was at first denied, even though there had been an
interference with a business that shipped coal in interstate commerce.
See Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 259 U. S. 344, 410, 42
Sup. Ct. 570, 583 (1922). It was finally proved on new evidence that
the local union had intentionally interfered with a specific shipment of
one coal car. This act was purely incidental to the purpose,- of the
union but was sufficient to impose responsibility, in combination with a
hypothetical design to control prices. Supra note 23. For disculsions
of the case in the present connection, see Comment (1925) 34 YALE L. f.1
897; Note (1922) 71 U. OF PA. L. REv. 48; (1925) 35 YALE L. J. 111.
55 See Locker v. Am. Tobacco Co., 218 Fed. 447, 448 (C. C. A. 2d,
1914); of. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, 29 Sup.
Ct. 511 (1909), where the injuries were done under the authority of a
foreign jurisdiction and so could not be impeached: recovery was denied.
Similarly in Keogh v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 260 U. S. 156, 43 Sup, Ct.
47 (1922), recovery wak denied, where the injury, though arising from
a conspiracy in violation of the Anti-Trust Act, was the immediate result
of a legal act, the setting of a railroad rate approved by the Interstate
Commerce Commission.
- Monarch Tobacco Works v. Am. Tobacco Co., supra note 11; Ware-
Kramer Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., supra note 40; see Swift & Co.
v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 396, 25 Sup. Ct. 276, 279 (1905).
- See Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., supra note 34, at 458; Ar-
kansas Brokerage Co. v. Dunn & Powell, supra note 26, at 902. Whore
the defendant is engaged solely in manufacture the court will a fortiori
demand a "direct" restraint of interstate commerce, before it will hold
the defendant. Penn. Sugar Refining Co. v. Am. Sugar Refining Co.,
mupra note 7.
58 Cf. G EN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMIATE CAUSE (1927) 122.
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that the restraint must be a "general" restraint, or "complete, '"
but this can hardly be regarded as requisite today.,c  Though
it was apparently thought at first that any restraint of inter-
state trade was actionable whether reasonable or not,' ith
the enunciation of the "rule of reason" by the Supreme Court
in the Standtrd Oil and American Tobacco cases,c- the courts
changed front and now profess to grant damages only when the
injury is the result of an unreasonable restraint.63
In evaluating the efficacy of section 7 several facts are note-
worthy. About eighty separate actions have found their way
into the reports, many of them more than once, in the thirty-
eight years since the Act's existence. No attempt has been
made to trace unreported'decisions and the figures are conse-
quently only indicative. Of the reported cases about one-third
have apparently resulted in recovery, and almost a half seem to
have denied recovery.," The number of recoveries, though not
the percentage of them, has increased rather than decreased,
there being only three recoveries reported prior to 1905, none
of them before 1900.65 "Trust-busting," whether by the govern-
ment or by individuals injured, is at best a tedious process. In
the four years during which the American Tobacco Company
was being sued by the government, some four separate damage
suits were brought with apparent success against that combina-
tion.6 On the other hand some of the private actions for
59 See Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. Howard Watch Co., sp7a note
13, at 646.
60 See Monarch Tobacco Works v. Am. Tobacco Co., supra note 11, at 731.
61 See Wheeler-Stenzel Co. v. Nat. Window Glass Jobbers Ass'n, atpra
note 29, at 868.
62 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct. 502 (1911);
United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 100, 31 Sup. Ct. G32 (1911).
63 The court in Union Castle Mail S. S. Co. v. Thomsen, 190 Fed. 536 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1911), promptly reversed a previous decision, 16 Fed. 251 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1908), where recovery was granted on the ground that a restraint
was illegal whether reasonable or not. Later, however, the Supreme Court
reasserted the defendant's responsibility on the ground that the rule of
reason was not new and had been taken into account by the jury in the
trial court. Thomsen v. Cayser, 3,.pra note 20.
64 The rest of the eases deal largely with questions of proccss and juris-
diction, and there can be no way of telling whether recovery was granted
if the jurisdictional difficulty was overcome. All the cases that bcar on
the larger questions of responsibility have been listed in the notcz.
,MThere were two cases settled adversely to the plaintiff prior to 1900.
Dueber Watch Case Co. v. Howard Watch Co., supra note 13; Lorwnstein
v. Evans, 69 Fed. 903 (C. C. D. S. C. 1895) (state not responsible as
defendant).
66 United States Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co.; Weisert Bros. Tobacco
Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., both mtpra note 30; Monarch Tobacco Worls v.
Am. Tobacco Co., supra note 11; Ware-Kramer Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco
Co., sv ra note 40. The case of United States v. An. Tobacco Co., aupro
note 62, was begun in 1907 and decided in 1911.
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damages have taken over ten years.0 7  It is possible that the
tripling of the damages makes a court less ready to grant
recovery. 8 But most of the difficulties of suit, which are prob-
ably instrumental in limiting the number of actions, are inherent
rather in the nature of the evil than in the inadequacy of the
remedy. 9
Perhaps the most notable effect of the Act is to provide
a check on the more obvious types of unscrupulous and high-
handed dealing in attempts to monopolize, as seems to be true in
the case before us. Bearing in mind that the object of the Sher-
man Act was to protect the public from the evils of monopoly,
though one may question both its wisdom and its efficacy in
attempting to do so by the maintenance of the competitive sys-
tem, still it seems a logical conclusion from the cases that section
7 has in fact tended to lessen some of the evils of monopoly,
without unduly restricting honest co-operative efforts. On the
other hand, if its main purpose was remedial one would be
inclined to doubt its success. 0
THE EFFECT OF WAR UPON TREATIES AND PRIVATE RIGHTS
UNDER TREATIES
When war has supervened, and neither the executive nor the
legislature has subsequently indicated the fate of pre-war treaties
with the enemy, how are judges and private individuals to know
the precise effect of the outbreak, continuance, and termination
of the war upon treaty rights? The modern and prevailing
doctrine is stated to be that provisions compatible with a state
of hostilities, unless expressly terminated, will be enforced, and
those incompatible, rejected., This standard, by which a treaty
6 Thomsen v. Cayser, supra note 20, begun in 1903 under the name of
Thomsen v. Union Castle Mail S. S. Co., and finally decided in 1917, is an
outstanding example. See also the labor cases, supra note 23.
68 Most of the states have anti-trust statutes providing for private dam-
ages, and a few provide for double or triple damages, notably California
and Indiana, respectively. But actions seem to be infrequent under any
of these statutes.
Go In one case, a plaintiff, evidently distrusting the efficacy of the statu-
tory remedy, sued a combination at common law, for damages sustained
plus double punitive damages. Recovery was denied, as no injury arising
from the combination was proved. Corn Exchange of Buffalo v. Patterson,
238 Fed. 549 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916).
70 The fact that only six separate defendants out of 104 against whom
decrees were obtained up to 1926 by the government under section 4 of
the Sherman Act, and not one out of those convicted criminally, have been
held responsible in triple damages in the reported cases, is significant of the
ineffectiveness of section 7 as a remedy, but not necessarily so as a pre-
ventive. See SEN. Doc. No. 79, 69th Cong. 1st Sess. at 2.
1 Techt v. Hughes, 229 N. Y. 222, 128 N. E. 185 (1920), 11 A. L. R.
180 (1921), cert. denied, 254 U. S. 643, 41 Sup. Ct. 14 (1920).
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might become judicially unenforceable before it had been offi-
cially renounced, is uncertain enough. It would even appear to
be misleading, in the light of three recent federal decisions in
immigration cases, holding certain treaty provisions still opera-
tive after the treaties had been officially regarded as term-
inated.2 These seeming inconsistencies arise out of the fact
that such treaties play a dual role, being on the one hand com-
pacts between sovereigns, and on the other immediate sources of
private rights.3
The valid e dstence of a treaty at any given time is a political
question not properly a matter for judicial determination. But
where the political departments have not indicated what effect
war has had upon a treaty, and where the legislature has passed
no subsequent statute inconsistent with the treaty, 5 a court may
be forced to decide the matter for itself. The problem of the
legal effect of war upon treaties is thus encountered and dealt
with on two different planes: first, that of political acts, and
second, that of judicial decisions.
Where an instance of the recognition of a principle can be
2 Hempel v. Weedin, 23 F. (2d) 949 (W. D. Wash. 1928) (holding a
provision of the treaty of 1828 with Prussia still in force as modified by
the Immigration Act); Cook v. Karnuth, 24 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 2d,
1928) (holding article 3 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 with England still in
force), cert. denied, 49 Sup. Ct. 12 (1923) (but the Supreme Court han
reversed its decision and consented to review the case, NEw Yormz Tirig,
Nov. 20, 1928, at 1); MlcCandless v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 71 (C.
C. A. 3d, 1928) scemble.
The treaty of 1828 with Prussia did not survive the termination of the
world war. Note (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 752, 75G (citing a letter to that
effect from the Under Sec'y of State, dated Nov. 29, 1926). The Jay
Treaty has been officially regarded as terminated by the War of 1012.
5 MOMs, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST (1900) § 779 (citing a letter from the
Sec'y of State of June 23, 1885, 156 Ms. Dom. LE'T. 80). But cf. Fox ,.
Southack, 12 Mass. 142 (1815) ; Society for the Propagation of the Go.spel
v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464 (U. S. 1823); Sutton v. Sutton, 1 Russ. &
M. 664 (1830).
3UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Art. 6, § 2; Head Money Cases, 112 U.
S. 580 (1884). Courts in Germany, Switzerland, and France have shown
a tendency to apply the provisions of promulgated treaties as a rule of
decision. But in England it is fairly well established that a treaty is not an
immediate source of law for the courts, except prize courts. An enabling
act of Parliament is necessary. Wright, The Legal Naturc of Trcatits
(1916) 10 Am. J. INT. Lw 706.
. 4Head Money Cases, svpra note 3; Dickinson, International Political
Questions In the National Courts (1925) 19 Amx. J. INT. LAW 157. In
theory the French courts are similarly restricted to interpretation and ap-
plieation when dealing with treaties stipulating for private rights. (1905)
32 Clunet 361; (1914) 41 Clunet 904.
5 An act of Congress may supersede a treaty. The Cherokee Tobacco,
11 Wall. 616 (U. S. 1870); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S.
581 (1889).
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found in the dealings of sovereign states it is obviously a prec-
edent of great weight. On the basis of such precedents a cer-
'tain amount of generalization is possible. Treaties made ex-
pressly in anticipation of war survive its outbreak.0  Treaties
meant to establish a status or vest a right are not abrogated by
war.7 Within this category are placed treaties relating to boun-
daries, cessions, recognition, and public debts., They have been
likened to documents of title.9 It is also well settled that prop-
erty rights once vested under a treaty are not affected by a
subsequent termination of the treaty.10
As to other types of treaties there is a diversity of opinion.11
Treaties of peace have frequently contained provisions for the
re-establishment of prior agreements, or for a modus vivendi
pending the conclusion of new agreements.12 But these provi-
sions have not usually been so phrased as to clarify the status
of the pre-war treaties previous to the signing of the peace
treaty.'3 It is frequently said, though not with as much au-
thority or conviction as might be desired, that stipulations per-
taining to commerce and navigation, social intercourse, and the
enjoyment of economic and political privileges are abrogated by
war between the parties.14
But there is strong authority for the view that such treaties,
and particularly those which stipulate for private rights, are
6 Provisions for the treatment of nationals of either in the territory
of the other in wartime, stipulations for the protection of neutrals, and
stipulations that merchants of the enemy shall be allowed a certain time
to settle their affairs and leave the country are of this class and have
been recognized in practice. 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1922) § 548;
MOORE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 779; of. Schulz v. Raimes, 99 Misc, 626, 164 N.
Y. Supp. 454 (City Ct. N. Y. 1917), aff'd, 100 Misc. 697, 166 N. Y. Supp, 567
(Sup. Ct. 1917).
7 MooOE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 779. Treaties of this type have been
termed dispositive conventions. 2 VATTEL, DROIT DEs GENS (1916 Classics
of Int. Law ed. of text of 1758) c. 12, § 192; 1 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL
Lkw (1904) 60.
8 CRANDALL, TREATiEs (2d ed. 1916) § 181; Moore, The Effect of War
on Public Debts and on Treaties (1901) 1 COL. L. REv. 209.
9 CRANDALL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 443.
10 5 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 780; Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259
(U. S. 1817).
1.' HYDE, op. cit. supra note 6, § 547; MooRE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 779;
CRANDALL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 451.
12 See collections of these treaty provisions in FAUCHILLE, TRAITI DE
D~orr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (8th ed. 1921) t. II, § 1049 (2); HxnE, op.
cit. supra note 6, at § 550. Sometimes old treaties are continued, or most-
favored-nation treatment adopted, as a modus vivendi pending new treaty
arrangements. Ibid. ; see also CRANDALL, Op. cit. supra note 8, at § 181.
13 Reference to these agreements has assumed various forms. Sometimes
they have been "confirmed," sometimes "re-established," "maintained,"
"revived," "continued in force," or "renewed." Ibid.
124 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 550.
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merely suspended during hostilities, to revive proprio vi,ore
when hostilities cease.s War merely creates an impossibility
of performance, which does not outlast the war.0  At the close
of the World War the question of the continuance of pre-war
treaties of the Allied and Associated Powers with Germany
was dealt with in article 289 of the Treaty of Versailles." It
was provided that each Allied or Associated Power might, by
giving notice to Germany within sLx months, revive such treaties
as it desired. This arrangement, together with the provision in
article 289 that treaties not so revived "are and shall remain
abrogated," does not compel an interpretation that certain pro-
visions of the old treaties were more than merely suspended up
to the expiration of the period allowed for revival by notifica-
tion. 8 As for the treaties not so revived, the question whether
they were abrogated by the outbreak of war or merely suspended
is of course academic.
Up to this point the effect of war on treaties has been con-
sidered from the viewpoint of public international law. The
viewpoint of a court forced to deal with the problem in deciding
a case involving private rights appears to be rather different.
When no indication of the status of the treaty has been given
by the political departments, how do courts deal with the matter?
In an early case the United States Supreme Court declared:
"We think, therefore, that treaties stipulating for permanent
rights, and general arrangements, and professing to aim at per-
petuity, and to deal with the case of war as well as of peace, do
not cease on the occurrence of war, but are, at most, only sus-
pended while it lasts; and unless they are waived by the parties,
or new and repugnant stipulations are made, they revive in their
operation at the return of peace." '9
In a more recent case the standard is formulated by a state
court thus:
25 FORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CODIIED (Borchard's Trans. 1918) § 14'3;
FUNCK-BRENTANO ET SOREL, PRECIS (0d ed. 1900) 247; CALYo, LF DRo=r
INTERNATIONAL (5th ed. 1896) t. III, § 1662; t. IV, § 1931; FAUCHILLE, op.
cit. supra note 12, § 1049 (D); M ORE, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 779;
CRANDALL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 451.
20 See article by Coulon in (1926) 53 Clunet 465; but cf. Ainn!,ition dc.-
T-ait s Bikatirawu o Coilectifs par la Gverrc (1915) 11 R. D. I. PRiVl 5.
:1 See text in THREE TREATIES, ETC. BETWEEN TIE UNITED STATES AXI)
OTHER POWERS, .3329. This collection is publishcd as SEN. Dec. No. 048,
67th Cong., 4th Sess.
I S But cf. HYDE, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 551 (view that this article
of the peace treaty manifested no guiding principle indicative of the effect
of war on treaties other than one normally destructive of the contractual
relationship).
19 Society for The Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, supra note
2, at 494.
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" .... treaties which it is reasonably practicable to execute
after the outbreak of hostilities must be observed then, as in the
past. The belligerents are at liberty to disregard them only
to the extent and for the time required by the necessities of
war." 20
This standard includes the idea that treaties are not necessarily
indivisible, and that a provision in question may be considered
still in force even though other portions of the treaty are sus-
pended or abrogated."
It may be noted that the courts are not in the habit of in-
quiring of the State Department as to the validity of a treaty
before them. They profess rather to look to the intrinsic nature
of the treaty provision involved and to determine the effect of
war thereon by applying an external standard.2 2 This suggests
that in a proper case some types of treaty provision would be
held judicially unenforceable, in which event the court would
appear to be applying something analogous to the maxim rebus
sic stcntibus, i. e., the doctrine that treaties, for the duration of
whose obligations no special period is fixed, are not to be under-
stood as binding on the contracting powers in the event of some
material change in the conditions with reference to which they
were concluded.23  After the World War French courts appear
to have inclined in this direction, contrary to their pre-war
doctrine; 24 and the German Reichsgericht in 1925 is reported to
have held the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 25 with Russia abrogated
by the rupture of diplomatic relations and ensuing events, al-
though there had been no renunciation either express or implied
by the German government.2 r It was a case involving private
rights under the treaty.
20 Techt v. Hughes, supra note 1, at 242, 128 N. E. at 191.
21 For an objection to this view see FAUCmLLE, op. cit. supra note 12,
at § 1049 (5) (advantages stipulated for in one provision are usually
given in exchange for .those granted in others). But compare the state-
ment of Lord Bathurst to Mr. J. Q. Adams concerning the question
whether the "liberties" granted American fishermen under the treaty of
peace between England and the United States were terminated by the
War of 1812: "The treaty of 1783, like many others, contained provisions
of different characters, . . . some in their own natuire irrevocable,
and others of a temporary character." MOORE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 383.
22 See Note (1921) 34 HARv. L. REV. 776.
23Williams, The Per-manence of Treaties (1928) 22 Al J. INT. LAW 89;
LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIEs OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1927) 167. A case can hardly be imagined where the courts would
apply the maxim rebus sic stantibus and declare a treaty unenforceable
on that ground. PERGLER, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw IN THE UNITED STATES (1928) 180.
24 See cases cited in (1926) 53 Clunet 465, 472.
25 The treaty was promulgated June 7, 1918. REICHSGESETZBLATT (1918)
654.
26 This case is commented upon in (1926) 53 Clunet 465.
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But the validity of a treaty under our law is a political ques-
tion. Events furnishing just international grounds for its abro-
gation by the political authorities render a treaty voidable, but
not void.27 Thus the necesegry and roluntay validity of treaties
have been distinguished, the former referring to the obligation
imposed on all branches of the government because of the legal
ratification of the treaty, the latter to the voluntary continuance
of the treaty by the political authorities.23 Its rescission requires
a public act of which the courts must take notice,-3 and to regard
the mere declaration of war as such a public act would be to beg
the whole question. For in treaties stipulating for private
rights, concluded for an indefinite period and containing no e%-
press condition relating to war, the intention of the parties is
not sufficiently clear, nor is there a legal presumption sufficiently
established to enable a court keeping witlin the bounds of inter-
pretation to conclude that abrogation has taken place by opera-
tion of war.-
No case has been found in which an American court has of
its own accord held a treaty abrogated by war. While the
United States was at war with Austria, the New York court
treated as still in force a provision of the treaty of 1843 accord-
ing Austrians the right to take land by descent in this country.-
On -May 11, 1922, it became clear that this treaty was abrogated
by failure to "revive" it by notification.2- After the war and
up to the present date courts have gone further, holding pro-
visions of the treaty of 1828 with Prussia, relating to rights of
land inheiftance and of entry by the nationals of each into the
territory of the other, as still in force,3 although since May 11,
27 Matter of Thomas, 23 Fed. Cas. 13, 857 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1374);
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, sztpra note 5; PEILEs, op. cMt pra
note 23, at 180.
28 Wright, op. cit. smpra note 3, at 722.
29 Schultz v. Raimes, .vpra note 6 (but the treaty provision here involved
-was made expressly in contemplation of war); PEnGLErn, op. cit. supra
note 23, at 180.
3o Any attempt to read an implied condition relating to war into such
treaties would seem to exceed the scope of interpretation. The question
of the effect of war on these treaties is more a question of the prcsent
policy of the political departments than of the intention of the parties
at the time the treaty was concluded.
*1 Techt v. Hughes, sipra note 1 (article 2 of the treaty was in quc:-
tion. For the text of the treaty see 9 STAT. 944 (188); 1 TILLoy,
Tm4ATw.S (1910) 34).
32 See Note (1927) 40 HAnT. L. REv. 752, 757 (citing letter of Feb. 1, 1927
to that effect from the Under Sec'y of State).
33 State v. Reardon, 120 Kan. 614, 245 Pac. 153 (1926); Hempel v.
Weedin, szpra note 2. These cases dealt with articles 14 and 1 of the
treaty respectively. For the text see 5 STAT. 378 (1S23); 2 ZMALLLOY,
op. cit. smipra. note 31, at 1496.
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1922, at least, it has been indisputable that this treaty was abro-
gated by failure to "revive" it by notification31 In one of these
cases the court put the decision upon the ground of reciprocity,
admitting that the treaty did not "profess to aim at perpetuity.' s'3
It is apparent that the courts confined themselves to doing
what appeared to be justice between private parties. Such in-
cidental rulings as they were forced to make regarding the post-
war survival of treaty rights, as, for example, to prevent a for-
feiture of the plaintiff's land in State v. Reardon, seem hardly
to have been intended as precedents for the effect of war upon
treaties as such. So far as the decisions go, private rights and
privileges guaranteed by a pre-war treaty would seem to con-
tinue pending new contractual arrangements by the sovereign
parties; and the provisions from which these rights and privi-
lekes are derived may continue temporarily to be applied by the
courts as a modus vivendi after the treaties have been officially
terminated.
DEFINITION OF "INTOXICATING LIQUORS" IN THE NATIONAL
PROHIBITION ACT
Federal and state courts have from time to time been called
upon to give judicial interpretation of the definitions of "intoxi-
cating liquors" found in various prohibition enforcement laws.
The problem has two aspects. It is first necessary to determine
the extent to which an arbitrary limit on the alcholic content
of liquor, stipulated in the statute, is controlling as against the
question of whether or not the liquor is intoxicating in fact. It
is also necessary, granting an excessive alcoholic content, to de-
termine whether the liquor is fit for beverage purposes. Courts
have always had difficulty in defining the term "intoxicating
in fact" as a matter of law and have usually been content to
leave the question to the jury.' A definition of the term involves
a consideration of certain physiological factors. Medical au-
thorities state that one-tenth of one per cent of alcohol in the
blood is necessary to produce the mildest form of intoxication.
But it is difficult to determine the exact point of the alcoholic
content of a beverage at which this effect can reasonably be said
to follow. For instance, some doctors have estimated that the
3 See Note (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 752, 756.
35 Hempel v. Weedin, supra note 2.
36 Supra note 33.
1See Texarkana Ry. v. Frugia, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 48, 53, 95 S. W. 663,
565 (1906). In Midland Valley Ry. v. Hamilton, 84 Ark. 81, 104 S. W.
540 (1907), the court concluded that the problem should be left to the jury
without any attempt at definition. Accord: Brooke v. City of Morrilton,
86 Ark. 364, 111 S. W. 471 (1908); cf. Defining the Term "Intoxicatng
Liquors" (1919) 89 CENT L. J. 57.
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consumption of nearly two gallons of 2.75 per cent beer is re-
quired to inject a one-tenth per cent alcoholic proportion.
Intoxication has been held synonymous with"drunkenness" and
"inebriety." 3 It would properly seem to imply some undue or
abnormal emotional state and an impairment in some degree of
the mental faculties.4  Under such a definition, laws which de-
fine intoxicating liquors as those containing over one-half of
one per cent of alcohol would seem to include in the ban bever-
ages which are not actually intoxicating. Not only does the
inebriating effect of a liquor vary with the age, sex, health and
general habits of the drinker,5 but intoxication itself affects
different individuals in different ways. In view of the inade-
quacy of expert evidence, 7 non-expert testimony is admissible
to prove intoxication. Since the term seems incapable of any
2 bid. 58.
3 See United States v. Hill, 1 F. (2d) 954 (D. Bid. 1924); ling v. Ring,
112 Ga. 854, 856, 38 S. E. 330, 331 (1901); Freeburg v. State, 92 Neb.
346, 349, 138 N. W. 143, 144 (1912); National Council of Knights and
Ladies of Security v. Wilson, 147 Ky. 293, 296, 143 S. W. 1000, 1002 (1912) ;
O'Connell v. State, 5 Ga. App. 234, 236, 62 S. E. 1007, 1003 (1903);
WEBSTER'S DICTIoNAn; STANDARD DICTIONAnY.
4Wadsworth v. Dunnam, 93 Ala. 610, 13 So. 597 (1893); Freeburg v.
State, supra note 3; Standard Insurance Co. v. Jones, 94 Ala. 434, 10 So.
530 (1892); ef. also Columbia Insurance Co. v. Touscy, 152 Ky. 4-7, 153
S. W. 767 (1913); STANDARm DIcTIoNARY; Report of the British Mcdical
Association (1927) 1 CoNN. B. 3. 297.
Wheeler, What is Beer? (1919) 89 CCN'T. L. J. 203.
0 "In some it quickens the intellectual faculties and sharpens the phyoieal
sense, and in others the intellectual faculties are for a time destroyed and
the physical senses blunted." Texarkana Ry. v. Frugia, suprm note 1, at
53, 95 S. W. at 565; see St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Waters, 105 Ar:.
619, 624, 152 S. W. 137, 139 (1912).
The law recognizes various degrees of intoxication. See Elkins v. Busch-
ner, 16 Atl. 102, 104 (Pa. 1883); quoted in State v. Baughn, 162 Iowa
308, 311, 143 N. W. 1100, 1101 (1913); see also Paris & G. N. fly. v.
Robinson, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 12, 13, 114 S. W. 658, 61 (1903); State v.
Yates, 132 Iowa 475, 478, 109 N. W. 1005, 1000 (1900).
7 "The chief medical examiner of the city of New York charactcrizcd
the problem as 'the best all round guessing game of all time.' Hamlin,
Intoxication: How Proven a7d Defied (1927) 1 CoNN. B. J. 294, 296.
See also Bartlett, When is a Man Lcgal1 Sober? (1913) 52 Am!. L. RTW.
409; Thornton, Undcr the I22flutrwe of Inztox:catizg Liqzor (1923) 4 IND.
L. J. 123.
Whether an expert regards a certain liquor as intoxicating or not de-
pends upon whether his definition of intoxication includes a slight or
large amount of exhilaration. See PEAriL, ALcoHOL AND PIYsIO Loy
(1927) 73, 75, 76.
s Commonwealth v. Boyd, 246 Pa. 529, 92 At]. 705 (1914); American
Bauxite Co. v. Dunn, 120 Ark. 1, 173 S. W. 934 (1915); Edwards v. City
of Worcester, 172 Blass. 104, 51 N. E. 447 (1893). As to whether the jury
should be permitted to taste or smell the liquor, see (1924) 23 McII. L
Rzv. 299; (1926) 25 MICH. L. REV. 198.
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adequate definition," decisions might arrive at opposite results
on similar facts.
Where the statute merely contains such general terms as
"strong and spirituous liquors," or merely "intoxicating
liquors," 10 courts have had little difficulty in construing the act
as forbidding only those liquors which are in fact capable of
producing intoxication." But where the statute expressly pro-
vides that beverages containing a certain percentage of alcohol
shall be deemed intoxicating liquors, 22 the prohibition is regarded
as operating without reference to any question of the intoxicating
effect of the liquor, and the prosecution must prove merely that
the alcoholic content of the alleged liquor did in fact exceed the
statutory limnit.'1 Where the definition is "alcohol in any quan-
tity," 14 the presence of but a slight trace of alcohol is sufficient
to bring the liquor within the statutory prohibition." Much con-
fusion has resulted where the statutory definition included
"spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors, or any other intoxicating
liquor." "6 (Italics ours). Some courts have regarded the second
9 See Midland Valley Ry. v. Hamilton, supra note 1, at 87, 104 S. W.
at 542 (1907); Brooke v. City of Morrilton, supra note 1, at 365, 111 S.
W. at 471 (1908) ; Feiganspan v. Bodine, 264 Fed. 186, 204 (D. N. J. 1920).
10 Mo. Laws 1923, 242, § 20 ("intoxicating liquors"); *Ga. Laws 1907,
81, § 1 ("alcoholic or spirituous liquors"); N. Y. Laws 1857, c. 628, § 10
("strong and spirituous liquors").
1 State v. Brock, 280 S. W. 48 (Mo. 1926); Roberts v. State, 4 Ga.
App. 207, 60 S. E. 1082 (1908); Board of Excise v. Taylor, 21 N. Y.
173 (1860); People v. Schewe, 29 Hun 122 (N. Y. 1883); Arbuthnot v.
State, 56 Tex. Cr. 517, 120 S. W. 478 (1909); of. Commonwealth v. Louis-
ville & N. Ry., 140 Ky. 21, 130 S. W. 798 (1910) (statute included "any
spirituous, vinous, or malt liquor;" held liquor must be proven intoxicating
in fact).
12 nd. Acts 1923, c. 23, § 1; MASS. STAT. (1888) c. 219; MASS. REV.
LAWS (1902) c. 100, §§ 1, 2; National Prohibition Act, 41 STAT. 305 (1919),
27 U. S. C. § 4 (1926).
13 Ellis v. State, 198 Ind. 679, 154 N. E. 280 (1926); Commonwealth
v. Brelsford, 161 Mass. 61, 36 N. E. 677 (1894); Commonwealth v. Nicker-
son, 236 Mass. 281, 128 N. E. 273 (1920); Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251
U. S. 264, 40 Sup. Ct. 141 (1920); Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U. S.
350, 40 Sup. Ct. 486 (1920).
:14 Mo. REV. STAT. (1899) § 3032; Wis. STAT. (1923) § 165.01.
Is State v. Martin, 230 Mo. 1, 129 S. W. 931 (1910). Every drink no
matter how harmless is excluded if it contains any alcohol, including
ginger ale and "pop." Davis v. State, 187 Wis. 115, 203 N. W. 760 (1925);
State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 76 Iowa 243, 41 N. W. 6 (1888) (statute
forbade "alcohol, wine, beer, spirituous, vinous, and malt liquors and all
intoxicating liquor, no matter how- diluted or disguised"); State v. Colvin,
127 Iowa 632, 103 N. W. 968 (1905) semble.
i13N. D. Ray. CODSS (1899) § 7598; MIss. CODE (1906) c. 40, § 1746, as
amended by Laws 1908, c. 115; WASH. CODs (Remington, 1915) § 6262;
Mont. Laws 1917, c. 143, § 2.
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phrase as modifying the first, and held that liquors in both classes
must be proved to be intoxicating in fact. 17 Others have construed
the second phrase to be disjunctive, with the result that a liquor
brought within the first phrase is deemed prohibited without
further question of its intoxicating effect.' In cases involving
the well known liquors, courts will take judicial notice that
whiskey, gin, brandy, wine, "moonshine" and common beers are
intoxicating.19 But such judicial knowledge has been denied in
the cases of "home brew",20 "still beer" and the like,2' a mixture
containing whiskey,2 and where the liquor contains a very small
percentage of alcohol, such as one-half of one per cent. -:"
1 State v. Virgo, 14 N. D. 293, 103 N. W. 610 (1905) ; Fuller . City of
Jackson, 97 Miss. 237, 52 So. S73 (1910). The War Time Prohibition Act
[40 STAT. 1046 (1918)] prohibited the manufacture of "beer, wine or other
intoicating malt or vinous liquors for beverage purposes." This was
supplemented by a regulation from the Internal Revenue Department
[Treasury Decision 2788] decreeing that a beverage containing one-half
of one per cent of alcohol would be regarded as intodicating. The courts
disregarded this regulation and required that all liquors must be shown
to be intoxicating in fact. United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U.
S. 210, 40 Sup. Ct. 139 (1920); Jacob Hoffman Brewing Co. v. McElligott,
259 Fed. 321 (S. D. N. Y. 1919); United States v. Petts, 260 Fed. 063
(D. Mass. 1919); cf. People v. Strickler, 25 Cal. App. 60, 142 Pac. 11211
(1914) (local option statute forbade "spirituous, vinous, or any other
intoxicating liquors containing one per cent of alcohol;" held, all liquors
must be shown to contain one per cent of alcohol).
s But beverages not included in this number would have to be shown
to be intoxieating in fact. Re Lockman, 18 Idaho 465, 110 Pac. 253 (1910) ;
State v. Centennial Brewing Co., 55 Mont. 500, 179 Pac. 296 (1919);
State v. Hemrich, 93 Wash. 439, 161 Pac. 79 (1916).
29 Albert v. United States, 281 Fed. 511 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922) (whiskey);
Strada v. United States, 281 Fed. 143 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922) (wine); State
v. Harris, 106 Ore. 211, 211 Pac. 944 (1923) (moonshine whiskey) ; State
v. Tisdale, 54 Minn. 105, 55 N. Y. 903 (1893) (brandy); ef. also United
States v. Silvia, 28 F. (2d) 73 (D. 'Wyo. 1928); 5 T.IG tOf , EVmENCO
(2d ed. 1923) § 25S2; (1926) 25 MicH. L. REV. 193. But it has been held
that to constitute beer within the Volstead Act it must be beer as dicfined
in the Act, and the opinion of government agents who were not chemists,
attempted no analysis, and established no expert qualifications by drinh-
ing it, would afford no basis for a conviction. Berry v. United Statez, 275
Fed. 680 (C. C. A. 7th, 1921).
20 Keen v United States, 11 F. (2d) 260 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; Sheridan v.
State, 159 Ark. 604, 252 S. W. 579 (1923); (1926) 25 MIcH. L. RLy. 198;
WIGLIORE, loc. cit. supra note 19.
21 Vanmeter v. Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 465, 273 S. W. 36 (1925) ("ztill
beer") ; Richardson v. State, 21 Okla. Cr. .93, 203 Pac. 1052 (1922) (choc-
taw beer).
2 Hiatt v. State, 189 Ind. ,524, 127 N. E. 277 (1920).
-3 "We cannot say as a matter of law that a beverage containing one-
half of one per cent of alcohol is intoxicating." United States v. Standard
Brewery, supra, note 17, at 220, 40 Sup. Ct. at 141; see State v. Harris,
supra, note 19, at 217, 211 Pac. at 946; State v. Piche, 93 Mle. 348-I, 351, G6
Atl. 1052 (1903) (same as to a beverage containing three per cent alcohol
by volume).
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Normally under the Volstead Act it is sufficient to prove as
provided in section 1, title 2,24 that the liquor contains one-half
of one per cent of alcohol or more.2 But section 29,20 specifying
penalties for violation of the act, provides, "such penalties shall
not apply to non-intoxicating cider and fruit juices exclusively
for use in one's own home." In a recent case, United States V.
Picalas,7 it was held that non-intoxicating liquors in section 29,
excepted only those liquors which were not prohibited by section
1, title 2, and that it was therefore illegal to have on one's
premises for his own use any beverage containing as much as
one-half of one per cent of alcohol. It was admitted that the
defendant had made sixty gallons of elderberry wine, containing
five per cent of alcohol and fit for beverage purposes, and that
he had stored them on his premises exclusively for use in his
own home. Evidence that the wine might not be intoxicating
in fact was declared irrelevant.
An opposite construction, had previously been reached .in
United States v. Hill.28 That decision was based on the follow-
ing reasoning. If it was intended to punish persons for manu-
facturing for use in their homes cider and fruit juices contain-
ing more than one-half of one per cent of alcohol, there was no
necessity for section 29, as the Act already provided such punish-
ment. If it was intended to protect people who manufactured
cider and fruit juices containing less than one-half of one per'
cent of alcohol, the provision was unnecessary as the other sec-
tions did not provide for punishing them. This conclusion has
been supported by a subsequent decision in United States v.
2441 STAT. 307 (1919), 27 U. S. C. § 4 (1926) provides: "When used
in this title . . the word liquor or the phrase intoxicating liquor
shall be construed to include alcohol, brandy, whiskey, rum, gin, beer, ale,
porter, and wine, and in addition thereto, any spirituous, vinous, malt, or
fermented liquor, liquids, and compounds, whether medicated, proprietary,
patented, or not, and by whatever name called, containing one-half of one
per centum or more of alcohol by volume which are fit for beverage pur-
poses. ..
25 United States v. Massei, 295 Fed. 683 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924); Jacob
Ruppert v. Caffey; Rhode Island v. Palmer, both supra note 13.
2641 STAT. 316 (1919), 27 U. S. C. § 46 (1926) provides: "... The
penalties provided in this chapter against the manufacture of liquor with-
out a permit shall not apply to a person for manufacturing non-intoiccatiny
cider and fruit juices . . . exclusively for use in his home, but such
cider and fruit juices shall not be sold or delivered except to persons
having permits to manufacture vinegar." (Italics ours).
2727 F. (2d) 366 (N. D. W. Va. 1928).
28 1 F. (2d) 954 (D. Md. 1924). Here evidence was held admissible to
show that cider though containing over one-half of one per cent of alcohol
was not in fact intoxicating. The defendant was charged with manufactur-
ing 25 gallons of wine and 30 gallons of cider, the government offering
evidence tending to show that the liquor containing more than one-half
of one per cent.
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I-ner; the Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously holding that
it was evident from the plain language of the Act that Congress
intended to take out of section 1, title 2 the general class of non-
intoxicating ciders and fruit juices for the home.y Although the
jury found the alleged wine to contain one-half of one per cent
of alcohol, the conviction was reversed on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove that the liquor was intoxicating in
fact.- The legislative intent to require proof of the actual in-
toxicating properties of liquors under the exception in section
29 seems reasonably clear both from the records of the debates
in Congress 3 and from the language of the Act itselfP Any
other construction would render the exception nugatory.^3
29 8 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925). The indictment alleged the
possession of "into=icating liquor, to wit, 70 gallons of grape wine." The
defendant had made the wine from cherries and elderberric. There was
disputed testimony as to whether this concoction was fit for beverage pur-
poses, some witnesses saying it was so bitter it could not be drunk, and
others saying it tasted like wine. The prosecution admitted the wine was
not in fact intoxicating in order squarely to settle the construction of §
29 of the Volstead Act.
3oJudge Webb said, "as the writer was a member of the lower house
when this act was passed he can say without doubt that the foregoing
construction was the intent and meaning of the statute."
31 The court in United States v. Picalas, supra note 27, tried to distin-
guish the case from United States v. Isner, supra note 29, on three grounds:
that in the latter case (1) the only evidence as to the alcoholic content of
the wine was the opinion of government witnesses that it actually did con-
ain one-half of one per cent of alcohol, (2) testimony was conflicting
as to whether it was fit for beverage purposes, some witnesses claiming
it was so bitter that it could not be drunk while others thought it tastcd
like wine, (3) the admission by the prosecution that the wine was not in
fact intoxicating prevented the court from taldng judicial notice that the
preparation was intoxicating. These would hardly seem to be sufficiently
material to justify disregarding its authority. In the Isner Case, the jury
found that the wine did in fact contain one-half of one per cent of alcohol.
The mere fact that it was slightly bitter would hardly deprive it of its
character as an intoxicating beverage. See b fra note "J9. It Sesms quez-
tionable whether any court would take judicial notice that a mixture con-
taining one-half of one per cent of alcohol is intoxicating. See spi-a note
23. The court does not mention United States v. Hill, supra note 28.
3258 CONG. REC., 2466-2869 (1919).
It has been suggested that section 29 was in the nature of an enforce-
ment act without which the Volstead Act could not have been pascxd.
B ACKMORE, PROHMrITON (1925) 600, 601; see also THoira, Pon0mi-n0,;
.'ND INDtS .riAL LiQuor (1926) § 980.
3A court interpreting somewhat similar state statutes agrees with the
constructions made in United States v. Hill, and United States v. Isner,
rather than with United States v. Picalas. A statute forbade the sale of
any spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, or any imitations or substitute
thereof which contained as much as one-half of one per cent of alcohol.
Oxr.A. InZv. LAws (1910) § 3605. It was provided, also, that the sale of
apple cider was lawful, provided it was not of such a character ab to be
subject to a special tax under the revenue laws of the United Statc3.
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Since the statutes forbid only intoxicating beverages, mere
proof of the liquor's alcoholic content is not usually regarded as
sufficient. The prosecution must also establish that the liquor
is fit for beverage purposes.3' Not having been furnished any
statutory test for determining when the liquor is to be deemed
fit for drinking, courts have had considerable difficulty in dis-
posing of this phase of the question. A favorite method of
evading prohibition laws has been to adopt the guise of medi-
cines, or flavoring extracts. In combatting such evasions some
courts adopt the following test: "If the distinctive character of
the intoxicating liquor contained in a medicinal compound or
preparation is so destroyed that the mixture can not in reason
be used or styled as an intoxicating beverage and becomes in
fact a medicine, its sale is not a violation of prohibition laws." "
This test places the entire problem of determining when a prep-
aration is fit for beverage purposes upon the jury. A few
courts have construed the statutes as applying only to liquors
which the "reasonably prudent man might drink for purposes of
intoxication." 30
Ibid. § 3606. The court held that the sale of cider, non-intoxicating in
fact, was permissible even though it contained more than one-half of one pe
cent of alcohol. Coury v. State, 20 Okla. Cr. 8, 200 Pac. 871 (1921).
F4 Commonwealth v. Brennan, 159 N. E. 633 (Mass. 1928); Lambert v.
Yellowley, 291 Fed. 640 (S. D. N. Y. 1923); Scay v. State, 29 Okla. Cr.
189, 233 Pac. 766 (1925); Schraeder v. Sears, 192 Iowa 604, 185 X. W.
110 (1921); Worley v. State, 252 Pac. 852 (Okla. Cr. 1927). When a
liquor is described as an "intoxicating liquor" that designation signifies
that it is "potable as a beverage" or "fit for beverage purposes." People
v. Cioppi, 322 Ill. 353, 153 N. E. 604 (1926); State v. Brown, 151 Minn.
340, 186 N. W. 946 (1922). But of. State v. Cook, 53 N. D. 429, 206 N.
W. 786 (1925), where having shown that the liquid was alcohol, it was
not necessary to prove it was sold as a beverage or was fit for beverage
purposes; State v. English, 71 Mont. 343, 229 Pac. 727 (1924); and cases
cited infra note 45.
35 See Carl v. State, 87 Ala. 17, 6 So. 118 (1889); Pearce v. State, 48
Tex. Cr. 352, 354, 88 S. W. 234, 235 (1905); Berner v. MlcHenry, 151 N.
W. 450, 452 (Iowa 1915); Commonwealth v. Brennan, mpra note 34, at
634.
36 Wadsworth v. Dunnam, supra note 4; State v. Harris, supra note 19.
"'Intoxicating beverage,' does not include every liquid capable of being
swallowed by a human being for purposes of intoxication." State v. Ste-
wart, 157 La. 494, 502, 102 So. 584, 586 (1924) ; of. Roberts v. State, supra
note 11. "It is not sufficient if men with strong appetite become drunk
on it." United States v. Stubblefield, 40 Fed. 454, 455 (E. D. Mo. 1889);
see also Honaker v. State, 166 Ark. 97, 265 S. W. 353, 354 (1924). Judge
Brewer remarked that no one would think cologne or extracts of vanilla
intoxicating liquor within the prohibition laws. Intoxicating Liquor
Cases, 25 Kan. 751, 762 (1881). But see State v. Klein, inf/r note 42.
"Beverage" in the Eighteenth Amendment is not a technical word, but is
used in the ordinary sense of a "liquid for drinking and connotes that the
act of drinking is not accompanied by any ulterior purpose, or followed
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It seems clear that the alleged liquor need not have an agree-
able taste.3 7  Nor will the fact that it is slightly laxative '- or
bitter 3 deprive it of its potable qualities in the eyes of the law.
Mlany convictions are had even when the preparations are "harsh
and irritating to most people." 4" Jamaica ginger, a compound
possessing such qualities, has been the cause of much litigation.
Despite its high alcoholic content (eighty-eight to ninety-one per
cent), most courts have refused to take judicial notice of the fact
that it is an intoxicating beverage.-" Where actual intoxication is
impossible because the liquor would induce sickness first, de-
cisions are in conflict on the question of the liquor's potability.4-
A certain tonic has been held an intoxicating liquor in one state
and an innocuous medicine in another. 3 In Maine, a liquor which
contained fifty-two per cent of alcohol was held to be intoxicating
even though.the one who drank it became unconscious immedi-
ately and remained so for several hours.- Decisions of this
nature can hardly be said to have any reference to what might
reasonably be deemed an intoxicating liquor fit for beverage
purposes. 5
The confusion which has resulted from an attempt to read
by any beneficial result, present, potential, or even hoped for." Falstaff
Corp. v. Allen, 278 Fed. 643, 645 (E. D. Mo. 1922).
7 "As for that matter some people can't drink pure alcohoL" State .
National Selright Ass'n., 192 Iowa 629, 185 N. W. 145 (1921).
38 State v. Ganthier, 121 Mie. 522, 118 Atl. 380 (1922); State v. Andr'wz,
188 Iowa 626, 176 N. W. 637 (1920).
3" Collins v. State, 143 Ark. 604, 221 S. W. 455 (1920); State v. Nat.
Selright Ass'n, supra note 37.
1- State v. Johnson, 113 S. C. 350, 101 S. E. 851 (1920) ; Commonwealth
v. Lanides, 239 Mass. 103, 131 N. E. 302 (1921); see Davis v. State, 106
Tex. Cr. 425, 430, 292 S. W. 1109, 1110 (1927). But cf. Commonwealth
v. Sookey, 236 Mass. 448, 128 N. E. 78S (1920); Schemmer v. State, 105
Neb. 324, 180 N. W. 581 (1920); Young v. State, 137 Miss. 188, 102 So.
161 (1924).
41 Commonwealth v.. Sookey, Young v. State, Commonwealth v. Lanides,
all supra note 40.
42 State v. Klein, 174 N. W. 481 (Iowa 1919) (convicted); Shracder v.
Sears, supra note 34 (not guilty) ; see infra note 43.
43Berner v. McHenry, svpra note 35 (held a beverage). Contra: Geer
Drug Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 104 S. C. 207, 88 S. E. 448 (1916).
- State v. Sayers, 121 Me. 339, 117 AtI. 235 (1922).
47 Some cases have held that the prosecution nced not show that the
liquor is suitable as a beverage if it is in fact sold as a beverage. People
v. Muetzel, 121 Ore. 561, 254 Pac. 1010 (1927) ; Davis v. State, szpra note
40. "For that matter most of the liquids now giving basis for so many
prosecutions for the violation of our prohibition statutes are not really
suitable for beverage purposes." Arnold v. Town of Hamilton, 21 Ala.
App. 548, 109 So. 896 (1926). But in Triner v. Shaneks, 43 S. D. 523,
180 N. W. 955 (1921), the statutory requirement of "suitable for bvcrag,
purposes" was construed to mean suitable in the ordinary meaning of the
term as opposed to capable of being swallowed.
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workable definitions into statutes prohibiting liquor traffic would
seem to be a result of the conflict in points of view as to the
enforcement requirements of the statutes and a reflection of
varying popular attitudes toward these acts. On the one hand,
there are many who contend that since the purpose of prohibi-
tion is to curb the use of intoxicants, and not merely alcohol
generally, statutory definitions ought to bear some relation to
*what might reasonably be deemed intoxicating, and what might
sensibly be called a beverage.46 They contend that the alcoholic
limit of the Volstead Act is arbitrary, and exceeds the authority
of the Eighteenth Amendment in that it proscribes a large num-
ber of liquors which are not actually intoxicating beverages. 41
There is also a large group which, despite the Supreme Court de-
cisions, still denies the constitutionality of the Eighteenth
Amendment itself.48 But, on the other hand, the protagonists of
prohibition contend that a ban on liquors not in fact intoxicating
and not actually fit for beverage purposes is a necessary incident
to the effective enforcement of the law. It seems that the court
in any case cannot avoid being influenced by its attitude toward
the policy of prohibition laws. United States v. Picakaq may be
an illustration of the operation of these inarticulate considera-
tions. The court appeared to be so desirous of securing what
it deemed an adequate enforcement of the Volstead Act that it
applied penalties to certain acts for which the Volstead Act it-
self and previous judicial decisions had granted immunity.
WORDS NECESSARY TO CREATE A SPENDTHRIFT TRUST
Although the controversy concerning the validity of "spend-
thrift trusts" I has been settled in most jurisdictions by statute
46 See Thorpe, Intoxicating Liquor Law (1926) 14 GEO. L. J. 315.
,7 See Conboy, Has the Volstead Act Nullified the Eighteenth Amend-
ment? (1928) 16 GEO. L. J. 348; Thornton, Legislative Definition of Con-
stitutional Terms, "Intoxicating Liquors" (1920) 90 CENT. L. J. 389.
48 STEVENSON, STATES RIGHTS AND NATIONAL PROHIBITION (1927);
Manion, What Price Prohibition? (1927) 2 NOTRE DAME LAW. 73; Buford,
The So Called Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States (1928) 14 VA. L. REV. 432; Dailey, Intemperance of Fanaticism
(1926) 1 NOTRE DAM LAW. 182 (1926); Jordon, Impressions of a Country
Lawyer (1925) 11 VA. L. REG. (N. s.) 323. For views upholding the de-
cisions, see Wheeler, The Power of Congress to Define the Term Intoxi-
cating Liquor (1919) 89 CENT. L. J. 320; BLA.EMORE, op. cit. supra note 32,
at 92; see also MCBAIN, PROHIBITION, LEGAL AND ILLEGAL (1928) C. 1, 2, 3.
11, 'Spendthrift trust' is the term commonly applied to those trusts that
are created with a view of providing a fund for the maintenance of another,
and at the same time securing it against his own improvidence or incapa-
city for self-protection. The provisions against alienation of the trust
fund by the voluntary act of the beneficiary, or in invitum by his creditors,
are the usual incidents of such trusts." 26 Am. AND ENG. ENCY. (2d ed.
1903) 138. For a discussion of the validity of these trusts cf. Nichols v.
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or judicial decision, there is still the open question as to when
an insta-ument is to be interpreted as creating such a trust.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the decisions based upon
an application of the "spendthrift trust" doctrine, it may be ad-
visable to dispose of another principle which seems to have con-
fused some courts. The only cases in which it.is necessary to
invoke the doctrine in question are those in which the beneficiary
takes a vested interest in the fund set aside for his benefit. Even
in those jurisdictions repudiating the "spendtlurift trust" doc-
trine it is conceded that a trust may be so created that no in-
terest vests in the one for whose benefit it is established and
that restraints upon the alienation of such an interest are valid.2
The authorities make it clear that this rule can be applied only
when the trustee has the privilege and power, but is under no
duty to pay over anything to the beneficiary2 One test is de-
clared to be whether the executors of the beneficiary would have
a right to call for any arrears.' A broad discretion in the trustee
as to the time and manner of payment does not bring a case
within this rule, as the trustee must be privileged to refuse to
pay over any part of the fund.2  The recent decision of Morrow
v. Apple 6 is apparently based in part upon this doctrine although
it would seem that the beneficiary had a right to a reasonable
allowance from the fund. The testathix devised her estate to
a trustee to manage, collect the rents, profits, and income and to
apply the same to the use of the testathix' son, with power in
the trustee to mortgage and sell, and to apply to the use of the
son so much of the principal as in the best judgment and dis-
cretion of the trustee might be found desirable to meet his re-
quirements. The court held that the beneficiary took no vested
interest in the income and it was not within the reach of his
creditors until paid to him. The court correctly construed the
will as referring to the discretion of the trustee, not of the bene-
ficiary, but it is submitted that the testatrhx intended to impose
upon the trustee the duty to exercise that discretion reasonably.
Eaton, 91 U. S. '716 (1875); 1 PERRY, TnusTs (6th ed. 1911) §§ 3S5, 3S6
(a) (b); GRAY, RESTRIN'TS ON TIE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (2d ed.
1895) §§ 165, 166.
2 Lord v. Bunn, 2 Y. and C. C. C. 98 (1843); Stone v. Wcstcott, 13 Rl.
I. 685, 29 AtI. 83S (1894); 1 PERRY, op. cit. szpra note 1, § 380 (a);
GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 166; KALES, FUTURE INTEncSTS (2d ed. 1920)
§ 731.
3 1 PERRY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 386 (b); GRAY, loc. cit. supra note 1;
KALEs, loc. cit. supra note 2.
-1 PERRY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 386.
SEndicott v. University of Virginia, 182 Mass. 150, 05 N. E. 37 (1902)
(trustee to pay over income to testator's daughter at such time and in
such sums as he deemed judicious); 1 PERRY, op. cit. wzpr note 1, § 38o,
(a) (b).
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The holding that the beneficiary took no "vested right" in the
income may probably be explained in that the term was used
in a loose sense to express the opinion that the broad discretion
given to the trustee was sufficient evidence of the testatrix' in-
tent to protect the income from the creditors or other trans-
ferees of her son. This rationalization is supported by the fact
that the court refers to the resulting relation as that of "spend-
thrift trust." Several other decisions are subject to the same
explanation.7  Even if based upon the intention to create a
"spendthrift trust" the decision in the Morrow case is question-
able.
8
Since the rule recognizing the validity of restraint upon the
alienation of equitable life interests is of recent origin, and ad-
mittedly counter to the strong policy against the inalienability
of wealth,9 it might be expected that the courts would require
a clear declaration of the settlor's intent in the instrument.
Strangely enough they are almost unanimous in the declaration
that neither an express provision against alienation nor the use
of the word "spendthrift," is required.10 In Connecticut the re-
quirements to be complied with were embodied in a statute
before the doctrine had attained its present popularity, with the
result that there is a stricter limitation on the spendthrift trust
than in any other of the states by which the doctrine is recog-
626 F. (2d) 543 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1928).
7 Meek v. Briggs, 87 Iowa 610, 54 N. W. 456 (1893) (property devised
to trustees who were to control the principal, applying the income to the
daughter's support, with provision that the trust was to be construed as a
limitation upon the daughter's title); Baker v. Brown, 146 Mass. 369, 15
N. E. 783 (1888). (estate devised to daughters subject to condition that
they should support their father during his life); Barnes v. Dow, 59 Vt.
530, 10 Atl. 258 (1887) (will bequeathed estate in trust to executor for
sister's support during her life). Although the same result could have
been reached in all these cases without resorting to the "vested right"
theory, in all of them the reason given for holding that the income was
not subject to the claims of creditors until it was paid over was that there
was no "vested right" until that time. Since these cases were decided at
a time when the validity of restraints upon the alienation of vested equit-
able interests was still in doubt in most jurisdictions, this was the safest
ground upon which to rest the decisions.
8 See infra notes 22 and 23.
9 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 166; 1 P nnY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 386.
1 o ones v. Harrison, 7 F. (2d) 461 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); Appeal of
Grothe, 135 Pa. 585, 19 Atl. 1058 (1890); Leigh v. Harrison, 69 Miss. 923,
11 So. 604 (1892); Seymour v. McAvoy, 121 Cal. 438, 53 Pac. 946 (1898);
Bennett v. Bennett, 217 Ill. 434, 75 N. E. 339 (1905) ; Mattison v. Mattison,
53 Ore. 254, 100 Pac. 4 (1909); Everitt v. Haskins, 102 Kan. 546, 171
Pac. 632 (1918); Maher v. Maher, 207 Ky. 360, 269 S. W. 287 (1924);
Eaton v. Levering, 81 N. H. 275, 125 Atl. 433 (1924); Eubank v. Moore,
297 S. W. 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
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nized.1" These other states, having abandoned the view that the
settlor must either specify that he is establishing a "spendthrift
trust," or expressly provided that the beneficiary shall have no
power to assign his interest, have found it almost impossible
to agree upon the proper limits of the doctrine. The most ex-
treme cases have held that a bequest or devise to a trustee to
pay over the income to the named beneficiary is sufficient to
impose the restrictions incident to "spendthrift trusts." ' The
result of these decisions is to create a presumption in favor of
such trusts whenever the income of a trust fund is to be paid
over to another. The New York statutes governing the matter
have adopted this view, since, in effect, they declare that every
trust to pay over income of personal property,' 3 or the rents
11 "Whenever property is given to trustees to pay over the income to
any person, and there is no provision for accumulation, and the trustees
are not expressly authorized to -withhold such income, and the income is
not expressly given for the support of the beneficiary or his family, such
income shall be liable in equity to the claims of all creditors of such
beneficiary." CONN. GEN. STAT (1918) §§ 5872, 5873; Carter v. Brownell,
95 Conn. 216, Ill Atl. 182 (1920) (e-x-press provision that the income should
not be liable for beneficiary's debts, but since the mode of creating "spend-
thrift trusts" provided by statute was not adopted in the case, the pro-
vision was held ineffective. This seems too great an insistence upon form,
since the purpose of the statute was probably only to require a clear ex-
pression of intent).
Jones v. Harrison, supra note 10 (income to be paid to son direct; the
corpus in three installments at ten year intervals: trustee in banlruptcy
could not reach beneficiary's interest); Appeal of Grothe, szp7a note 10
(interest to be paid to son annually during his life: Eon's interest could
not be assigned); Higbee v. Brockenbrough, 191 S. W. 994 (Mo. 1917)
(trustee authorized either to invest the fund in a home for the beneficiary,
or to invest it at interest and pay the income to her during her life: income
could not be reached by creditors); Siegwarth's Estate, 226 Pa. 591, 75
Atl. 842 (1910) (income to be paid to son annually; no part of principal
to be paid to him for five years and then only if trustee thought him
competent: son could not assign his interest); cf. Bennett v. Bennett,
svpra note 10 (bequest to trustee to pay income to son annually until he
attained age of forty years: son could not terminate this trust; declaration
that this was a spendthrift trust not necessary to decision).
13"The right of the beneficiary to enforce the performance of a trust
to receive the income of personal property, and to apply it to the use
of any person cannot be transferred by assignment or othervise." N. Y.
PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (1917) § 15. A trust to pay over income to
another is one "to apply to the use of" another within the statute. Matter
of Ungrich, 201 N. Y. 415, 94 N. E. 999 (1911). Where payment of an
annuity is not limited to income but may be made out of principal, if neces-
sary, the statute does not apply. Wells v. Squires, 191 N. Y. 529, S4 N. E.
1122 (1908). A judgment creditor may reach the surplus income beyond
what is necessary for the suitable support of the cestui and those de-
pendent upon him. Wetmore v. Wetmore, 149 N. Y. 520, 44 N. E. 169
(1896).
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and profits of real property 14 is a "spendthrift trust." In the
absence of such a statutory provision, the result reached is justi-
fiable only upon the assumption that these trusts have become
so common that there is a presumption in fact that the testator
desired to create such a trust inferable from the provision in
the will for a life interest in the beneficiary. In several of these
cases the language of the will was supplemented by extrinsic
evidence of circumstances existing at the time the will was ex-
ecuted.15 The justification offered is that extrinsic evidence is
admissible to explain ambiguous words in a will. But were the
words ambiguous in these cases? 20 The recent Pennsylvania
decision of McCurdy v. Bellefonte Trust Co.17 registers a dissent
from the view of these courts. The case is doubly interesting
in that the "spendthrift trust" doctrine originated in Pennsyl-
vania, and it was there that the rule of liberal construction had
its birth in Appeal of Grothe.18  Although the court stresses
the provision that the real estate might be sold only with the
consent of the son as affirmative evidence of the testatrix' faith
in his judgment, it repudiates Appeal of Grothe, and leaves the
impression of a conviction that it is desirable not only to call a
halt, but to take a step backward. The decision is unquestion-
ably sound. The same result has been reached upon similar
facts in other jurisdictions.19
14 "The right of a beneficiary of an express trust to receive rentg and
profits of real estate and apply them to the use of any person cannot be
transferred by assignment or otherwise." N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW (1917)
§ 103. A statute provides also that creditors may reach a surplus beyond
the sum necessary for education and support of the cestui. N. Y. REAL
PROPERTY LAW (1917) § 98. The statute does not apply where the settler
is beneficiary also. Newton v. Hunt, 201 N. Y. 599, 95 N. E. 1134 (1911).
The Civil Practice Act provides that where a judgment has been re-
covered and where an execution has been returned wholly or partly un-
satisfied, and where any income from trust funds or profits are due to
the debtor, to the amount of $12 or more per week, the judgment creditor
may upon satisfactory proof obtain an execution against such income which
shall become a lien upon such income, but the amount is not to exceed ten
per cent of the total income payable to, the debtor. N. Y. C. P. A. § 684.
IS Bennett v. Bennett, supra note 10 (adult beneficiary had failed in
business); Maher v. Maher, supra note 10 (beneficiary known to be ex-
travagant); Appeal of Grothe, supra note 10 (beneficiary insolvent when
will was executed).
16 The following cases held that such language was not ambiguous, and
extrinsic evidence was excluded. In neither case was the trust upheld.
L'Hommedieu v. L'Hommedieu, 131 Atl. 302 (N. T. Eq. 1925).; Rowley
v. American Trust Co., 144 Va. 375, 132 S. E. 347 (1926).
17 141 Atl. 247 (Pa. 1928) (residuary estate devised to trust company
to pay net income to children during their lives; trust company could sell
realty upon approval of son: judgment creditor of son could garnishee
his share of the income).
18 Supra note 10.
29 L'Hommedieu v. L'Hommedieu, supra note 16 (devise to executors to
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Where the will or settlement declares that the income is to
be used for the support, comfort, or education of the beneficiary
there is ample authority to the effect that no further declaration
of intent is necessary.20  Besides the element of discretion in the
trustee the words used by the testator in these cases indicate
that his purpose in declaring the. trust was to make the provision
best caldulated to insure the support and comfort of a beneficiary
thought to be incapable of providing for himself. These facts
justify the holdings, and since the language of such wills would
ordinarily bear two reasonable interpretations, the admission
of extrinsic evidence is unobjectionable21 So much cannot be
said for those cases where the only indication of the testator's
purpose contained in the instrument is the fact that a broad
discretion as to time and manner of payment is vested in the
trustee.2 2  It has been shown that the vested right theory is not
pay net income to son for life; son could assign); McCrea v. Yule, 63 X.
J. L. 465, 53 Ati. 210 (1902); cf. Tilton v. Davidson, 93 Me. 55, 50 Atl.
215 (1903) (will appointed daughters trustees to pay over income of estate
to themselves for life: though a "spendthrift trust" was held to have
been intended, it was not created and daughters could assign).
20 Seymour v. McAvoy, supra note 10 (estate to trustees to manage and
invest in order to provide out of income for the comfortable support of
testator's wife: judgment creditor could not reach income before it was
paid). Accord: Leigh v. Harrison, svpra note 10 (devise in trust to pro-
vide comfortable support for son out of rents and profits); Hoffman v.
Beltzhoover, 71 W. Va. 72, 76 S. E. 968 (1913) (land devised to son -with
provision that if he sold it there should remain in the hands of the pur-
chaser and as a lien upon said land $2,500 for the sole use and support
of son during his life. Executor was appointed special trustee to collect
and pay over the interest on the $2,500 for the support of the son);
Mattison v. Mattison, supra note 10 (testator declared that in order to
provide for comfort of son and to give him a home during his life, he
should have use and profits of a farm devised to other brothers as trustees
to control) ; Eubank v. Moore, supra note 10 (trustees to pay over income
to testator's grandchildren in furnishing them necessaries and such other
things as might be suitable). Contra: Maynard v. Cleaves, 149 Mass. 357,
21 N. E. 376 (189) (income to be paid to beneficiary for her comfort and
support).
21 Seymour v. McAvoy, szpra note 10 (evidence of the circumstances of
the parties); Leigh v. Harrison, supra note 10 (evidence that beneficiary
was insolvent vhen will -was executed).
22 Eaton v. Lovering, supra note 10 (devise of trust property to be in-
vested and expended for son as his needs might require; judgment for
alimony could not be satisfied out of income in trustee's hands); Kiffner
v. Xiffner, 185 Iowa 1064, 171 N. W. 590 (1919) (bequest of $10,000 to
trustee to pay over such sums as he thought best for the well being of
the son: judgment creditor could not reach income. It could be argued
that son had no vested right here); cf. Morrow v. Apple, -up a note 6;
Wagner v. Wagner, 244 Ill. 101, 91 N. E. 66 (1910) (trustees directed to
pay income to sons at such times and in such amounts as they in their
discretion should deem proper; trustees authorized to pay part of the
principal or to terminate the trust at their discretion. Sons could not
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applicable to most of these cases, and it is submitted that the
mere fact that the settlor chooses to rely upon the judgment of a
trustee is not sufficient to raise a presumption that he intended
to restrict the beneficiary's power to assign his interest. 3 There
is sone justification for the admission of extrinsic evidence in
these cases,24 but it is doubtful whether the necessity for such
evidence is great enough to justify allowing such an opportunity
for fraud.2 5 One of the more recent cases 20 in Massachusetts
that might be cited in support of the view that the presence of
broad discretion in the trustee is sufficient is plainly distinguish-
able in that the spendthrift trust was not to arise unless and un-
til some proceeding for the seizure of the annuity was com-
menced. This was a clear indication that the testator desired
to provide against seizure for debt.
The cases where the will directs the trustee to pay over a fixed
monthly or yearly allowance, with power to increase the amount
in his discretion, present another troublesome problem. The de-
cisions have gone both ways.2 Here again there does not seem
to be evidence sufficient to justify the imposition of onerous re-
strictions upon the beneficiary's power to deal with his interest.
Where the will provides that the income is to be paid direct to
the beneficiary and his personal receipt taken,2 1 or where it is
provided that the income is to be enjoyed by a woman free from
the control of any husband,29 it is plain that a "spendthrift trust"
terminate trust as it was valid spendthrift trust. Result could have been
reached on ground that there was a valid gift not to take effect in posses-
sion until a future day); Wallace v. Foxwell, 250 Ill. 616, 95 N. E, 985
(1911) (income to be paid to son and his wife, trustees paying greater or
smaller amount to one or the other as they saw fit: a "spendthrift trust"
was held to have been created and son's interest could not be reached by
creditors. As it appears that the son had no right to any part of the
income, but only a beneficial liability, there was no necessity for invoking
the spendthrift trust doctrine).
23 Endicott v. University of Virginia, supra note 5.
24 Wallace v. Foxwell, supra note 22 (that beneficiary was unsuccessful
and in debt); Wagner v. Wagner, supra note 22 (that beneficiaries wore
adults); Eaton v. Levering, supra. note 10 (that beneficiary was a "spend-
thrift" and had a wife and child dependent upon him).
25 KALES, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 742.
26 Morel v. Cornell, 234 Mass. 563, 125 N. E. 575 (1920) (bequest of $10
per week to son; in case of any proceeding for the seizure of the annuity
upon process of law it should be deemed to have ceased to be payable to
the son, and should be payable to trustees to be applied by them in their
discretion for his benefit: annuity not subject to claims of creditors from
time attachment proceedings began).
2T Everitt v. Haskins, supra note 10 (spendthrift trust created). Accord:
Wood v. McCelland, 53 S. W. 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899). Contra: Mandors
v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co., 147 Md. 448, 128 AtI. 145 (1925); Wells
v. Squires, supra note 13.
28 Commerce Trust Co. v. Bayles, 273 S. W. 759 (Mo. App. 1925).
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was intended. The same result follows from a provision that
the income is to be paid to the beneficiary in his own proper
person, and not upon written or verbal order or any assignment
made by him.30 If the instrument is interpreted as creating a
"spendthrift trust" it is not permissible to show that the bene-
ficiary is in fact prudent and capable.2
In addition to expressing his purpose carefully the settlor who
desires to create a "spendthrift trust" should provide for a gift
over upon the death of the beneficiary or expressly limit his
interest to a life estate, as the prevailing view is said to be that
any restraints upon an interest in fee are invalid2 - There are
several cases upholding "spendthrift trusts" even when the in-
terest of the beneficiary amounts to a fee.23 The restraint im-
posed in these cases is effective only during the life of the bene-
29 Castree v. Shotwell, 73 N. J. Eq. 590, 6S Atl. 774 (1908).
20 Anderson v. Williams, 262 Ill. 308, 104 N. El. 659 (1914).
31 Ibid.; Wagner v. Wagner, szpra note 22.
32 Morgan's Estate (No. 1), 223 Pa. 228, 72 At. 498 (1909) (estatetotrus-
tee for benefit of husband with provision against assignment and direction
that after three years trustee should convey to any one designated by hus-
band, and if no direction was made to convey to whom he might appoint by
will, and in default of appointment to his heirs: husband's creditors entitled
to payment out of the estate); McCreery v. Johnston, 90 W. Va. 80, 110
S. E. 464 (1922) (devise to executors to be held for use of son, Vith
understanding that he could not charge it with his debts; such amounts
as might be proper for the support of himself for family to be paid to
him from time to time: as there was no gift over the devise created an
interest in fee and the attempted restraint was held ineffective) ; Kcyser's
Appeal, 57 Pa. 236 (1868) (share of estate devised to trustee in trust
for son and his heirs; son's interest not to be liable for debts: attempted
restraint ineffective as son took a fee); 1 PE Ry, op. cit. sz-apra note 1, §
386 (a); GRAY, op. cit. snpra note 1, §§ 114, 115; KAILS, op. cit. -?,pra note
2, §§ 739, 740. Despite the positive statements of these writers there is
little modern authority in this country one way or the other.
33 Jones v. Harrison, supra note 10 (in addition to the provision for the
payment of income it was provided that the corpus was to be paid to the
beneficiary in three installments at ten-year intervals: held a "spendthrift
trust" with no discussion of the nature of the beneficiary's intercst); In
re Siegwarth's Estate, s.pra note 12 (income to be paid to son but no
part of principal for five years and then only if the trustees thought him
capable: son could not assign. This ease leaves the law in Pennsylvania
unsettled upon this point. See (1910) 58 U. or PA. L. 1Ev. 493, 499);
Hopkinson v. Swain, 284 IIU. 11, 119 N. E. 985 (1918) (court upheld what
was admitted to be a "spendthrift trust" of an interest in fee) ; Boston Safe
Deposit and Trust Co. v. Collier, 222 Mass. '.90, 111 N. E. 163 (1916)
(after providing that every payment of income or principal dircctcd to b2
made should be made free from creditors and never by way of azsignment,
testator devised estate in trust to pay one-half the income to his son
for life and at his death the income was to be divided among his surviving
children until 21 years after their father's death when principal was to
be distributed: creditors of one of the children had no claim on the fund
until it was distributed).
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ficiary, and it is difficult to discover just why such a restraint
should be more objectionable than where the beneficiary takes
only a life interest. It is well settled that the settlor cannot es-
tablish a valid spendthrift trust for his own benefits,"' and in
declaring one for another he must take care not to create a pas-
sive trust which will be executed by the statute of uses.
Where there is any possibility of a difference of opinion, the
interpretation of any particular form of words will depend upon
the general attitude of the court toward the two conflicting poli-
cies involved in these cases. If the jurisdiction is one where the
prejudice against restraints upon alienation is still strong, the
court will'in all probability require a clear indication of the set-
tlor's purpose. Although few of the courts that have accepted the
doctrine at all follow Professor Kale's suggestion that "a spend-
thrift trust" is created only where there is in the instrument
an express restraint upon alienation, 0 the doctrine has been
restricted within narrow limits in New Jersey,81 Massachusetts,",
Virginia,89 and Connecticut."0 At the other extreme we find
Illinois,41 and some of the federal courts.42 Pennsylvania has al-
ways been put in this class but the most recent decision points
to a course between the two extremes. The tendency in Iowa
is toward liberal interpretation. 43 The argument for this view
is that the policy in favor of carrying out the desires of the
testator in the disposition of what was his to give outwveighs
the policy against restraints upon alienation. Conceding this,
34 Egbert v. DeSolmes, 218 Pa. 207, 67 Atl. 212 (1907); Stephens V.
Moore, 298 Mo. 215, 249 S. W. 601 (1923).
35 Spann v. Carson, 123 S. C. 371, 116 S. E. 427 (1923) (will provided
that all the estate given to the children shoufd be held in trust so that
their interests should not be liable for their debts: held a passive trust,
executed by the statute); Newcomb v. Masters, 287 Ill. 26, 122 N. E. 85
(1918) (land devised in trust, beneficiary to have the profits and rents
during her life, not to be conveyed or incumbered: held a passive trust,
executed by the statute).
86 KALEs, op. cit. supra note 2, § 742.
87 L'Hommedieu v. L'Hommedieu, supra note 16; McCrea v. Yule, supra
note 19.
88 Endicott v. University of Virginia, supra note 5; Maynard v. Cleaves,
supra, note 20. But of. Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Collier, supra
note 33.
3) Rowley v. American Trust Co., supra note 16.
40 Carter v. Brownell, upra note 11.
41Wallace v. Foxwell, supra note 22; Wagner v. Wagner, supra note
22; Bennett v. Bennett, supra, note 10; Hopkinson v. Swain, supra note 33.
Although the Illinois court has used broader language than any other,
practically all of the decisions can be supported on other grounds. See
KALES, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 743-748.
4 Morrow v. Apple, supra note 6; Jones v. Harrison, supra note 10.
48 Kiffner v. Kiffner, supra note 22; Horack, Spendthrift Trusts in Iowa
(1918) 4 IowA L. BULL. 139.
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it must be the duty of the court to discover what those de-
sires were by examining all sources at its disposal. But on the
other hand, inasmuch as the wisdom of the entire doctrine is
questionable, it might seem best to proceed slowly in order to
avoid the possibility of reading into an instrument a provision
that the maker never intended. The more extreme decisions not
only tend to nullify a -well settled policy embodied in the statutes
of wills, but leave the courts free to guess at the hidden intent
of the testator.
